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Abstract
This paper both theoretically and empirically addresses how a vertical structure in
the motion-pictures industry determines the number of prints a distributor releases
of a new ﬁlm. A simple theoretical model shows that the optimal number of copies is
increasing on the expected demand for the ﬁlm and the revenue share of the distributor,
and decreasing on the cost of each copy. The model also predicts that the optimal
number of copies will decrease with the number of theaters that are vertically integrated
with the distributor, as long as running a cinema requires ﬁnancing a non-negligible cost
of capital. The theoretical results are empirically tested using a very rich dataset of
ﬁlms exhibition patterns in the major Chilean markets. The empirical results show
that, on average, a non-integrated distributor releases 8 more copies than an integrated
distributor.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Once a movie is produced, it is distributed to theaters for its exhibition. The size of the
audience, however, is uncertain and the optimal number of copies to be distributed depends
on the expected demand for the ﬁlm. The distributor of a ﬁlm chooses a release pattern
-the number and location of theaters in which the ﬁlm is going to be shown- and a date at
which to release ﬁlms for exhibition, looking for high demand periods and seeking to avoid
competition from ﬁlms that are close substitutes. The size of the initial release determines
the number of prints needed for distribution to each of the theaters. A wide release on many
screens draws a large, simultaneous sample of consumers in many theaters and cities, but
the ﬁlm faces the risk of being played-oﬀ rapidly and be dropped from theaters. A tailored
release strategy samples consumers sequentially, starting at a few theaters and using the
information from that sample to adjust bookings if the ﬁlm builds an audience (De Vany
and Walls (1996)).
The paper both theoretically and empirically addresses the question of what eﬀect has
the vertical integration between distributors and exhibitors on the number of copies a dis-
tributor releases. For this purpose, a very simple theoretical model is derived and then a
count model of ﬁl m si se s t i m a t e du s i n gav e r yr i c hd a t a s e to fﬁlms released patterns in the
major Chilean markets. The results show that vertical integration between distributors and
cinemas yields fewer copies than the number of prints released by a non-integrated distrib-
utor. The empirical results also show that the number of copies increases with capacity
(either screens or seats) and if the ﬁlm is a sequel. On the other hand, the number of copies
2decreases with the total number of new ﬁlms nationally released either the same week or
t h es a m em o n t h .
The literature has studied the release pattern of ﬁlms and their duration, including how
vertical integration might aﬀect either of them. Corts (2001), addresses a similar question
to the one addressed in this paper, also related to how the vertical market structure changes
the optimal decision in the release pattern of a movie. Using aggregated data from the U.S.
ﬁlm exhibition market, his results show that vertical integration between producers and dis-
tributors yields an ineﬃcient release-date scheduling of a ﬁlm. The programming of ﬁrst-run
ﬁlms by exhibitors was considered by Chisholm, McMillan and Norman (2006), who show
that theaters under common ownership make similar programming choices, but the poten-
tial eﬀects of vertical integration were not analyzed. Gil (2007) studies the determinants of
vertical integration between distributors and exhibitors based on ex-post contractual costs.
The results show that integrated distributors are more likely to distribute ﬁlms with higher
renegotiation frequencies and also more likely to use their own theaters to exhibit them.
The survival of ﬁrst-run ﬁlms has been addressed by Chisholm and Norman (2006), who
show that the duration is aﬀected by intra-ﬁrm and inter-ﬁrm strategic choices, and by De
Vany and Walls (1997), who found that survival time is strongly related to the number of
initial bookings. In both cases the eﬀects of vertical integration were not considered. Finally,
Fu (2009) considers the eﬀect of vertical integration between distributors and exhibitors
and ﬁnds that ﬁlms released by integrated distributors are exhibited for shorter periods in
3distributor-owned theaters than in independently owned ones.1
The literature has addressed the eﬀects of vertical integration on the released date
scheduling of a ﬁlm, the type of ﬁlms distributed and also on the duration of ﬁlms, but to
our knowledge there is no empirical evidence on the eﬀects of vertical integration on the
release pattern of ﬁlms and, particularly, on the number of copies a distributor releases. The
goal of this paper is to ﬁll this gap and extend the empirical analysis on release patterns to
vertical integration, considering some speciﬁc characteristics of each ﬁlm (Oscar nominations
and awards, genre, sequels), of the theater where the ﬁlm is exhibited (capacity), and
some characteristics of the market at the time of release (holidays, number of new ﬁlms
released nationally). For this purpose we use a very rich dataset consisting of weekly ﬁlm-
programming for an average of 30 theaters in the 11 major cities in Chile during the period
January 2001 - December 2004.
The main empirical result of the paper shows that vertical integration towards the exhi-
bition market has a negative impact on the total number of ﬁlms released by a distributor.
On average, a vertically integrated distributor releases 8 less copies of a ﬁlm than a non-
integrate, keeping constant intra-ﬁlm, intra-theaters and market characteristics.
The structure of the paper is the following. In the next section we provide a short
description of the decision process for scheduling the release of a new ﬁlm in the motion-
picture exhibition market . We describe in section 3 the Chilean distribution and exhibition
markets. We present in section 4 a very simple static model for the optimal number of
1Similarly, the question of what determines the success of a movie is addressed by Bagella and Becchetti
(1999), De Vany and Walls (1997), Deucher, Adjamah, and Pauly (2005) and Jansen (2005), for respectively
the Italian, American, England, and German markets.
4prints that a distributor releases. We describe the data in section 5 and then we show the
results in section 6. Finally, we conclude in section 7.
2 Scheduling the Release of a New Film
The process of selling the right to exhibit a movie in a small country with almost no ﬁlm
industry , like Chile, works as follows.2 It starts when the distributors receives information
from the main Hollywood studios about movie titles, main actors and dates of release. This
information is not suﬃcient to forecast the potential demand for the movie, but it helps
the distributors to estimate what movies are most likely to be a blockbuster or a failure in
a speciﬁc market. After considering the studios information, the distributors recommend
a group of movies to be released in a speciﬁc market and the dates for release. With
this information, the studios decide the number of copies, dates of release and marketing
expenses in each market. Once the distributors know which movies and when are going to be
released in the market (line-up), they share the information with exhibitors and determine
the share of revenue for themselves.3
At that point exhibitors have not decided yet which movies are going to exhibit and
which ones will not. When the release date is closer and there is more information about
demand (from box oﬃce and admissions in other foreign markets), the distributor decides
a release strategy for the movie (number and location of theaters where the movie will be
2Canterbery and Marvasti (2001) provides a an adequate description of the functioning of this market in
the U.S. market.
3Goettler and Leslie (2005) shows the importance of risk-sharing using the contractual relationship be-
tween distributors and exhibitors in the motion-picture market.
5exhibited).
The exhibitors play an important role in the decision of the release strategy, because
distributors need enough available screens for the release date. If the exhibitors cannot
or are not willing to provide such number of screens, then either the release strategy or
t h ed a t em u s tb em o d i ﬁed. Just before the release date then, exhibitors and distributors
negotiate the exhibition of a movie. In general, movies are released either Thursdays or
Fridays. The release pattern and the number of copies a distributor chooses to release is,
therefore, determined mainly by the distributor but considering information provided by
the exhibitor.
An interesting broad question is then how diﬀerent relationships between distributors
and exhibitors might aﬀect the release pattern. As it was mentioned before, in this paper
we explore a more speciﬁc question related to the eﬀects of vertical integration between a
distributor and an exhibitor: how the vertical market structure aﬀects the number of copies
that the distributor releases into the market.
3 The Distribution and Exhibition Markets in Chile
The distribution market in Chile consists of three large companies (Andes Films, UIP,
and Fox-Warner) and a fringe of several small independent distributors. Table 1 shows the
market shares of the main distributors during the period 1999-2004. In the case of Chilean
movies, there exist also some distribution companies that are created with the purpose of
distributing a single movie.
6Table 1: Distributors
Andes Films Fox - Warner UIP Independents
1998 34.0% 40.7% 21.9% 3.4%
1999 29.5% 35.2% 21.5% 13.9%
2000 43.0% 26.1% 25.6% 5.3%
2001 27.2% 29.9% 29.2% 13.7%
2002 32.4% 40.1% 14.0% 13.6%
2003 31.7% 36.9% 21.3% 10.1%
2004 23.5% 45.6% 21.7% 9.3%
The three major distributors have exclusive contracts with Hollywood Studios: Andes
Film is the exclusive distributor of Columbia, Disney, and NU Vision; UIP is the exclusive
distributor of Universal, Paramount, and DreamWorks; and Fox-Warner is the exclusive
distributor of Fox and Warner.
The exclusive contract allows the distributors to distribute movies in Chile only for
exhibition on theaters. The contract does not allow the distributors to operate in other
exhibition markets like DVDs or Cable TV, but they are allowed to distribute independent
ﬁlms. Figure 1 shows the number of new releases by distributor during the period 1994-2004.
The exhibition market consists of three kind of participants: large international chains
(Hoyts, Cinemark, Showcase), smaller national chains (Chileﬁlms-Cinemundo and Show-
time), and small independent theaters. Tables 2 and 3 show the total seating capacity in
Chile by exhibitor and the box oﬃce revenues for 2004 by type of exhibitor.
One of the interesting characteristics in the Chilean market is related to the property
relationships between distributors and exhibitors. Hoyts is a franchising of the Australian
chain and in Chile is associated with AMC USA and United Shopping Center Chile. It has
















Table 2: Exhibitors’ Capacity
Total Capacity in Chile by Exhibitor in 2004
Screens Seats Share
Cinemundo 46 12,166 18.34%
Cinemark 95 20,505 30.91%
Hoyts 50 11,005 16.6%
Showcase 24 5,055 7.60%
Others 55 17,608 26.55%
Total 270 66,328 100.00%
theaters in Santiago (5 theaters with 50 screens) and Valparaiso (1 theater with 5 screens).
Cinemark is a franchising of the American chain with 95 screens (39 of them outside of
Santiago). Showcase is a subsidiary of National Amusement with 24 screens in Santiago.
Finally, Cinemundo is owned by ChileFilms, the same owner of the distributor Andes Films.
8Table 3: Exhibitors’ Admissions and Revenue
Admissions and Gross Box Oﬃce by type of Exhibitor in 2004
Rest of the Country Santiago
Admissions GBO (Ch$) Admissions GBO (Ch$)
National Chains 1,086,706 2,451,322,445 208,407 496,204,450
International Chains 1,934,404 4,095,920,250 4,120,907 9,541,446,740
Independents 456,158 784,441,700 6,939 7,916,566
Total 3,477,268 7,331,684,395 4,336,253 10,045,567,756
4 The Model
In this section, a simple model is used to show that theoretically the strategy a dis-
tributor chooses in the release of a movie depends, among several factors, on whether the
distributor is vertically related or not with exhibitors in the downstream market.
4.1 Assumptions
Consider a very simple static model in which there is one distributor, who has the
monopoly rights to distribute a movie in a given market, and there are several theaters
that may be either owned by the distributor or not. Assume also that the movie may have
substitutes in the market, but for simplicity suppose that there is no strategic behavior
regarding other distributors’ ﬁlm release decisions.
Let us assume that a mass of consumers are uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. If
there is a cinema located at point  into this interval that shows a movie, then all indi-
viduals located at a distance () on both sides of  go to this cinema. Consumers
located beyond 1
2() do not go to this theater. As consumers are uniformly distrib-
uted, the demand for watching the movie in a speciﬁcc i n e m ai s().T h i s c r i t i c a l
9distance is determined by a vector  that summarizes the expected consumer satisfaction
for attending to this movie; the booking for this movie, ; and the number of copies, .
We assume that the expected consumer satisfaction is a vector of multiple random vari-
ables, which could be separated into intra-ﬁlm characteristics such as genre, sequel, studio,
director and actors, previously known booking and prizes, country of origin, publicity, etc.;
intra-theater characteristics, such as number of screens and seats, infrastructure and com-
plementary amenities, exhibitor, etc.; and market characteristics such as competitors in the
neighborhood, simultaneous releases, weekend, holidays, etc.
We also assume that () is decreasing on  and not increasing on .I t i s
not increasing on  because as the distributor expects a higher demand for the movie it
would increase the number of copies, then in such a case this movie at cinema  will have
substitutes from the other  − 1 cinemas in the same market. To better understand of
this assumption, this spatial demand for a movie in a given theater, for  =1and 2 is
explained in Box 1.
10Suppose that theater A is located at A, B at B, etc. If A is the unique theater that exhibits this 
film, then its the market by consumers located in the interval [ A – ½Q(,P,1) , A + ½Q(,P,1) ]. 
A’s rivals do not exhibits the same film (neither a close substitute). Thus, all customers go to A. 
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                                                  A – ½Q(’,P,1)                           A + ½Q(’,P,1) 
If now ’ , the demand for the movie increases and more consumers go to theater A.  
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However, as the expected demand continues increasing to ” the distributor may prefer to
increase the number of prints for this film. Let us suppose that now that theaters B and B’
exhibit this film, then the demand for this film in theater A fells down even though the global 
demand for this film increases.  
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Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Q(,P,N) – a film’s demand in each theater – is not 
increasing on the number of prints.
Spacial demand as N increases
Assuming for simplicity that  is a positive real number, it is reasonable to suppose
that () decreases with  Without loss of generality, we assume that this demand is
separable such that ()=1 ( − )−2 (),w h e r e2 (·) is a function increasing
on  double and continuously diﬀerentiable, and strict convex.4 Thus, after adding for 
copies-cinemas in the market, the total expected demand for this movie, conditional on 
is  [1 ( − ) − 2 ()]
4To guarantee existence and uniqueness of an optimal  we suppose that
2()
 g o e st o0( i n ﬁnite) as
 goes to zero (inﬁnite)
11Regarding costs and revenues, we assume that each copy of the movie costs ,w h i c h
is a sunk cost for the distributor. Each cinema has operating costs of  for each consumer
and a cost of capital , being the last a sunk cost for the owner of the cinema. We also
assume that the revenue  is exogenously given and each cinema breaks even, then  is
lower than  to cover the sunk cost . If the distributor and the cinema are independent
the distributor keeps a share  of the box-oﬃce revenue and each cinema gets (1 − ).
Finally, we assume that a minimum condition for the release of a movie is that the dis-
tributor recovers her investment. Since we already have assumed that each theater’s demand
is decreasing on as u ﬃcient condition for the release of a movie is that 1 ( − )  
Next lemma is useful for later results.
Lemma 1 If an independent cinema at least breaks even, then it is true that the Lerner’s
index in this market is higher than the distributor’s box-oﬃce share. In other words, −
 

Proof. The proof of the lemma is straightforward. The fact that an independent cinema
gets zero expected proﬁtm e a n s(1 − ) [ [1 ( − ) − 2 ()]]−[ [1 ( − ) − 2 ()]]−
 =0or, (1 − ) −  = 
[1(−)−2()] Then it is true that marginal revenue must be
above marginal cost to ﬁnance the cinema’s sunk cost, or (1 − ) After some algebra,
−
  .
124.2 The Main Result: Vertical Integration and the Release of New Films
Let us assume now that the distributor owns  theaters in this market, with 0 ≤  ≤ 
. The latter inequality condition rules out the necessity for including the decision about




 ( − )[1 ( − ) − 2 ()] + ( − ) [1 ( − ) − 2 ()] −  − 
The ﬁrst order condition is suﬃcient given the strict concavity on the objective function.
Thus, after some algebra we get:







+  − 
¸
(1)
The next proposition shows that there exists a unique ∗ the optimal number of copies,
that solves (1)
Proposition 2 Assume that for a given movie with a vector of characteristics  and for
some small  it is true that  ( − )[1 ( − ) − 2 ()]+( − ) [1 ( − ) − 2 ()] 
 Then there exist ∗ that maximizes the distributor objective function and this ∗ is
unique.
5The condition might be obviously incorrect since  is endogenous, but for simplicity assume
that for most movies a distributor releases the optimal number of copies satisﬁes this condition.
13Proof. Consider  =0  In this case, the right-hand-side of (1) is equal to zero. Then,
1 ( − ) − 0
Consider now  going to inﬁnite. The left-and-side of (1) remains constant but the
right-hand-side of (1) goes to inﬁnite because of the conditions that we impose on 2 ()
Then, 1 ( − ) − ∞
Since 2 (·) is continuous and both 2 (·) and
2(·)
 are strictly increasing functions,
then by the mean value theorem there exists a unique ∗ that solves (1) This completes
the proof.
Finally, using this result and equation (1) we may ﬁnd the eﬀects on exogenous variables
on the optimal number of copies of a ﬁlm. In particular, our interest is to ﬁnd the eﬀects
on ∗ of a change on  (any change in an intra-ﬁlm, intra-theater, or a market variable)
and , the number of theaters vertically integrated. The next proposition summarizes this
comparative static analysis:





∗,t h e n( i )t h ee ﬀect of any exogenous variable on the consumer satisfaction function have
t h es a m es i g nt h a ti t se ﬀect on the optimal number of copies, and (ii) the eﬀect of vertical
integration on the optimal number of copies is negative.





 + ∗ − 
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and the vector  is exogenous, then it is also true that:
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Then, since the denominator is strictly positive, the sign of ∗
 is the same as the sign of
1
 , which complete the ﬁrst part of the proof for the proposition.
The proof of the second part of the proposition is the following. Consider an exogenous
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Since the denominator of this equation is positive and Lemma 1 shows that the numerator
of this equation is negative, then the eﬀect of an increase of the vertical integration between
a distributor and a theater is to reduce the number of copies of new released ﬁlms. This
completes the proof.
The proposition provides several hypotheses that could be tested empirically, the one
on the eﬀect of vertical integration being of particular interest. However, before proceeding
to the empirical part of the paper it is useful to show a close form solution for the model
and also check the robustness of this proposition to the case in which the distributor faces
15competition from other distributors.
4.3 An Example that Yields a Close Form Solution
Assuming that 1 ( − ) − 2 ()= −  − 2, the problem of a distributor that
owns  theaters is now:
max
{}
 ( − )
£
 −  − 2¤
+(  − )
£
 −  − 2¤
−  − 


















(1 − ) − 
3
which is strictly positive since  −  
  otherwise the distributor could not recover the
ﬁx e dc o s to fa ne x t r ac o p yo ft h eﬁlm.
As can be directly seen from the equation, the optimal number of copies is increasing
in  the vector of intra-movie, intra-theater and market variables; and decreasing in ,t h e
number of cinemas vertically integrated with the distributor  as can be shown by taking
























(1 − ) − 
3
=
(1 − ) − 
3
⎛
⎝  ((1 − ) − )
q
2 ((1 − ) − )
2 +3( )
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The expression in parenthesis is negative when the condition to release a ﬁlm is satisﬁed,
that is  −  
  Then, ∗
  0 since (1 − ) is greater than  as it was shown in
Lemma 1.
4.4 Robustness: Strategic Competition of Two Distributors
Let us show that the previous result is robust to a strategic interaction among distrib-
utors during the release of new ﬁlms’ decision. Without further loss of generality, assume
that two distributors are simultaneously deciding the number of copies for the release of
two new ﬁlms. One of the distributors, say distributor ,o w n s theaters and the other
distributor, say distributor , is not vertically integrated. Also assume, as before, that each
theater of distributor  receives the ﬁlm (  for any  resulting from the distributor
’s decision).
Assuming that both ﬁlms are perfect substitutes whenever they share the same vector
of characteristics  (intra-ﬁlm, intra-theater and market characteristics), then perfect susti-
tution implies that more copies of one ﬁlm reduce the demand for the other ﬁlm. Thus, the
demand for the ﬁlm that distributor  releases is  [ ( − ) −  ( + )],w h i c h
17is conditional on the conjecture about the other distributor’s decision:  Therefore, the
distributor ’s problem is:
Max

[ ( − )+(  − )][ ( − ) −  ( + )] −  − 
The ﬁrst order condition for this problem is:
−
 ( + )

[ ( − )+(  − )]+ [ ( − ) −  ( + )] = 
(2)
Similarly, the demand for the movie that distributor  releases is  [ ( − ) −  ( + )]
The distributor’s problem is:
Max

 [ ( − ) −  ( + )] − 
The ﬁrst order condition of this problem is:
−
 ( + )

 +  [ ( − ) −  ( + )] =  (3)
Let us assume that there exists a unique pair (∗
∗











18By Lemma 1, conditional on the intra-movie, intra-theater and market characteristics, the
number of copies a vertically integrated distributor releases is lower than the number of
copies that an independent distributor releases: ∗
  ∗
 This result is a substitute of the
one in Proposition 3 part ii).
Finally, this result should hold if we consider the case in which new releases with diﬀerent
characteristics are simultaneously entering the market. To see this, just consider that the
distributor ’s ﬁlm has a vector of characteristics 0 6=  In this case the ﬁlms are imperfect
substitutes and an increase in the number of copies of one ﬁlm partially reduces the demand
for the other ﬁlm. A parameter  ∈ (01) captures this partial reduction on demand. To get
a form close solution consider again the previous structure 1 ( − )−2 ()=−−2
Taking into account these assumptions, the problems of both distributors are:
Max

[ ( − )+(  − )]
h
 −  − ( + )
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The ﬁrst order conditions are:
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So, for any 0 ≥  - the vertically integrated distributor has a smaller or equal expected
revenue than the one expected by the independent distributor and it is true that ∗
  ∗

as before. Only if  0 is large enough it could be the case that an independent distributor
releases less movies than a vertically integrated one.
The following proposition summarizes the discussion for the case of strategic competi-
tion:
Proposition 4 Assume that two distributors simultaneously release one ﬁlm each. Assume
also that ()=1 ( − ) − 2 () i) If both ﬁlms share the same vector of
characteristics  then the vertically integrated distributor releases less prints of its ﬁlm than
the independent distributor, this is ∗
  ∗
 ii) If the vector of characteristics is such that
the expected demand for the vertically integrated distributor’s ﬁlm is equal or lower than its
rival’s expected demand, 0 ≥  then still ∗
  ∗
 iii) If ()= −  − 2,t h e n
only when the vertically integrated distributor expects a considerable higher demand for its
ﬁlm, it could be the case that ∗
  ∗

Proof. The proof of this proposition follows from the previous discussion.
As a summary, the hyphotesis to be tested empirically is that the vertical integration
between a distributor and a theater, conditional on the expected demand, yields a lower
20number of prints in new released ﬁlms. The empirical analysis requires then to control for
intra-movies, intra-theaters, and market characteristics in order to condition on .
5D a t a
The dataset used in the empirical analysis consists of weekly ﬁlm-programming data
for an average of 30 theaters in 11 major cities in Chile during the period January 2001 -
December 2004. For each theater, for each week, the data contain information on which
ﬁlms are exhibited at each screen, the weekly revenue generated by each ﬁlm, and the genre
of the ﬁlm. Additionally, the data includes information about the capacity of each screen,
the owner of each theater, the distributor of each ﬁlm, and the total number of screens
used for each ﬁlm’s ﬁrst week release. Unfortunately, we do not have information about the
expenses on advertising by the distributor of the ﬁlm.
The data contains many interesting features. In many small cities in Chile there used
to be only one theater and during the time span covered by the sample a new theater
was opened, which allows us to estimate the impact of entry in the market. There is also
exit of theaters during this period of time, particularly in the city of Santiago, the largest
one in the country. Additionally, among the three main distributors (Fox-Warner, Andes
Films, and UIP), one is vertically integrated towards the exhibition market and own several
theaters. Finally, based on empirical results showing that Oscar awards matter (Deuchert,
Adjamah and Pauly, 2005), we constructed several variables to capture the eﬀect of Oscar
nominations and awards each movie received. Table 4 shows a summary of the data.
21Table 4: Summary Statistics
Variable N Average Stand. Dev. Min Max
Action 10.566 0,284 0,451 0 1
Adventure 10.566 0,162 0,368 0 1
Comedy 10.566 0,249 0,432 0 1
Horror-Thriller 10.566 0,061 0,238 0 1
Drama 10.566 0,182 0,385 0 1
Crime 10.566 0,056 0,230 0 1
Documentary 10.566 0,005 0,071 0 1
UIP 10.566 0,012 0,107 0 1
Andes Films 10.566 0,027 0,163 0 1
Fox-Warner 10.566 0,271 0,444 0 1
Hoyts 10.566 0,221 0,414 0 1
Showcase 10.566 0,097 0,297 0 1
Cinemundo 10.566 0,166 0,372 0 1
Showtime 10.566 0,024 0,155 0 1
Chilean 10.566 0,064 0,244 0 1
Sequel 10.566 0,152 0,359 0 1
Capacity 10.566 245,49 101,86 90 990
Weekly Premieres 10.566 3 2 1 17
Monthly Premieres 10.566 10 4 1 25
Number of Screens 10.566 29,56 12,04 1 91
Vertically Integrated 10.566 0,064 0,243 0 1
Holiday Week 10.566 0,227 0,419 0 1
Oscar Award Nominations 10.566 0.52 1.63 0 13
Oscar Award Win 10.566 0.01 0.08 0 1
Oscar Award Best Actor/Actress 10.566 0.02 0.13 0 1
22We created a set of dummies for the genre of the movie (Action, Adventure, Comedy,
Horror-Thriller, Drama, Crime, Documentary, and Others)6, the distributors (UIP, An-
des Films, Fox-Warner, and Independents), the exhibitors (Hoyts, Showcase, Cinemark,
Cinemundo, and Independents), Chilean movies and sequels.
The other variables are deﬁned as follows: Capacity is the number of seats of each
screen; Weekly Premieres is the total number of new ﬁlms released in the country each
week; Number of Screens is the total number of screens used nationally to release the movie;
Vertically Integrated is a dummy equal to one if the distributor of the movie is Andes Films
(the only distributor that owns theaters in Chile); Holiday Week is a dummy equal to one
if either the week or the weekend in which the movie was released was a national holiday;
Oscar award nominations is the total number of nominations received by the ﬁlm; Oscar
Award Win is a dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁlm won the Oscar for best movie; and Oscar Best
Actor/Actress is a dummy equal to 1 if either the leading actor or actress in the ﬁlm won
an Oscar.
6 Empirical Results
Table 5 shows the results of the estimation using a negative binomial count model. The
dependent variable corresponds to the number of prints of a new released movie in the
ﬁrst-run exhibition market in Chile. We report the estimated coeﬃcient, its standard error,
and the marginal eﬀect of each variable on the expected number of copies a distributor
6These categories are the ones used by the distributors in Chile.
23Table 5: Negative Binomial Estimation
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Error Marginal Eﬀects
Capacity 0.00029 0.00004 0.0069
Action 2.54785 0.18559 14.139
Adventure 2.57902 0.18584 21.627
Comedy 2.25082 0.18561 11.921
Horror-Thriller 2.44044 0.18598 20.748
Drama 2.07520 0.18568 11.182
Crime 2.28230 0.18603 17.611
Documentary 1.54365 0.19251 8.634
Chilean 0.32911 0.01693 9.069
Sequel 0.17681 0.01329 4.512
Holiday Week 0.00913 0.00993 2.160
Weekly Premieres -0.01442 0.00243 -0.342
Monthly Premieres -0.01699 0.00119 -0.403
Oscar Award Nominations 0.19991 0.01200 5.044
Oscar Award Wins 0.03303 0.02003 0.773
Oscar Award Best Actor/Actress 0.07662 0.03583 1.888






All variables related to the genre of the movie (action, adventure, comedy, etc.) are
positive and strongly signiﬁcant. The marginal eﬀects imply that, on average, Adventure,
Horror-Thriller and Crime ﬁlms have the more expected return to the distributors in Chile
since more prints of these genres are released (around 21 more copies with respect to the
"Other" genre, the omitted category consisting mostly of local and arthouse movies). The
Comedy, Drama and Documentary genres are re l e a s e dw i t ham u c hl o w e rn u m b e ro fc o p i e s
7We also estimated a Poisson count model, which is more restrictive since it assumes equidispersion, but
the overdispersion test suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (1990) rejects the equidispersion assumption.
24(around 11 copies more than Other genre).
A sequel is released with around 5 more copies than a non sequel ﬁlm. Even though not
all sequels are as successful as the ﬁrst ﬁlm, the result is consistent with a higher expected
return given the success of the original ﬁlm. Not only the distributor has more information
about the expected box-oﬃce of the sequel because the attendance of the original ﬁlm is
known, but also the fact that the studios decided to produce a sequel of the ﬁlm signals a
more probability of success. In the case in which there are no higher expectations, probably
the sequel will be distributed directly to either the pay-per-view or the DVD market.
Regarding the importance of the Chilean cinema for a distributor, the results show that
a Chilean movie has almost 8 more copies released that a movie from abroad, everything
else constant. It is not clear, however, if this result reﬂects a stronger preference of the
public for Chilean movies, the eﬀects of many subsidies provided by the government during
the last 5 years to the production and distribution of Chilean ﬁlms, or just a marketing
strategy of larger chain exhibitors: they always have to exhibit a local movie.
The empirical results also show that if a ﬁlm faces more competition when it is released
the distributor reduces the number of copies, as the coeﬃcients of the variables Weekly
premieres and Monthly premieres are negative and signiﬁcant. The marginal eﬀects are not
large in magnitude however, if 10 more movies are released the same week the number of
copies is reduced by 3 and if 10 more movies are released the same month the number of
copies distributed of the ﬁlm decrease by 4.
Distributors, in general, expects higher admissions in holiday weeks, such as Christmas,
25Independence Day, Schools’ winter vacations, etc. A ﬁl mr e l e a s ei nah o l i d a yw e e kh a s
2 more prints, on average, everything else constant. Since the magnitude in not as large
as expected, a possible explanation is that intra-ﬁlm competition is more important in
explaining the number of prints, since the distributor is more concerned with how the ﬁlms
performs in the ﬁr s t - r u nm a r k e t( s u r v i v a l )r a t h e rt h a ni na ns p e c i ﬁc weekend. Alternatively,
people in large markets (cities) leave taking advantage of the holidays and, therefore, the
expected box-oﬃce is not much higher than on regular weeks.
Finally, and the most important result given the goal of the paper, a distributor who
owns a chain of theaters releases 8 less prints of a ﬁlm than independent distributors,
everything else constant. This empirical result is consistent with the theoretical results
derived before.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper explores the eﬀect of vertical integration, between an exhibitor and a distrib-
utor in the motion-picture industry, on the release of new ﬁlms. For this purpose, a simple
but robust model is build to determine the diﬀerent incentives a distributor faces when
integrated and when non-integrated. The model predicts a negative impact of the vertical
market structure on the number of prints a distributor releases of a new ﬁlm. This theoret-
ical result is then tested using a rich data set of the motion-pictures exhibition market in
11 major cities in Chile over a period of 6 years.
After controlling for several ﬁlm and market characteristics, the empirical results show
26that an integrated distributor releases, on average, around 8 less copies of a ﬁlm than a
non-integrated distributor. Future research should address if this eﬀect on the released
pattern of new ﬁl m si se ﬃcient or reﬂects the use of market power.
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